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COOKE, J.
The pertinent factual picture unfolds without dispute. On March 24, 1972,
Hiram Zeevi & Company (Uganda) Ltd., an Israeli corporation deposited with
defendant, Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., local currency valued at
approximately $406,846.80, for the purpose of establishing a fund upon which
plaintiff J. Zeevi and Sons, an Israeli copartnership, could draw money. On the
same date, defendant opened its irrevocable credit No. 110/84 for $406,846.80 in
favor of said partnership and issued a letter of credit acknowledging that it had
opened the irrevocable credit for "$406,846.80 (U.S. dollars four hundred and
six thousand eight hundred and forty six cents eighty)," and provided that the
credit amount be available against clean drafts drawn on the depositor in equal
amounts of $40,684.68 commencing April 15, 1972 and monthly thereafter. It
stated "[tihis credit is valid until 31st January, 1973 for presentation of drafts in
Kampala." The letter concluded with these provisions:
We guarantee the payment of drafts drawn in conformity with the terms and
conditions stated. The negotiating bank must send drafts direct to us by air-mail.
The negotiating bank is authorized to claim reimbursement for their payments on the
due dates listed above from First National City Bank, 399 Park Avenue, New York to the
debit of our account with them together with a certificate to the effect that all terms of
the credit have been complied with and the relative drafts have been airmailed to us.
By directives dates March 28, 30 and April 13, 1972, officials of the Bank of
Uganda, acting with the authority of the Minister of Finance under the Exchange
Control Act of Uganda, notified defendant that foreign exchange allocations in
favor of Israeli companies and nationals should be cancelled and, accordingly,
ordered it to make no foreign exchange payments pursuant to credit number
110/84. While, on April 4, 1972, defendant had informed its New York agent,
First National City Bank (hereinafter Citibank), of the issuance of the letter of
credit for "credit No. 110/84," defendant advised said agent, by cable dated and
received April 14, 1972 and by letter of April 17, 1972, that the Government of
Uganda had instructed it to cancel the letter of credit numbered 110/84 and
International Lawyer, Vol. 9, No. 4
796 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
directed said agent not to "effect payment against drawing US $40684-68 due to
be paid on or after 15th April 1972." A cable and letter bearing the same
respective dates and a corresponding message were forwarded by defendant to
said partnership. A letter dated May 5, 1972 from defendant stated: "In the
circumstances we have no option but to instruct our agents in New York not to
effect reimbursement of the drawing due to be made on 15.5.1972 without further
reference to us."
On December 28, 1972 Chemical Bank ("Chemical") presented to Citibank for
reimbursement ten drafts each for $40,684.68, totalling $406,846.80, drawn
under letter of credit 110/84, and on January 11, 1973 Chemical wrote to
Citibank that "we are again presenting our domestic collection R92049 in the
amount of $406,846.80 under irrevocable letter of credit 110/84, reimbursable
on your'good selves and ask for reimbursement as per the terms and conditions
thereof." On January 19, 1973 Citibank returned the subject drafts unpaid to
Chemical.
This action by the partnership, the beneficiary of the two letters of credit, and
J. Zeevi and Sons, Ltd., the assignee of said partnership, was commenced by an
order of attachment of November 24, 1972, whereby the funds of defendant on
deposit with Citibank were attached and defendant was served by publication.
Supreme Court denied defendant's motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
to increase the amount of plaintiffs bond on the attachment and to reduce the
amount of the attachment, both of which orders were affirmed by the Appellate
Division.
Defendant contends that the complaint must be dismissed because the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, that the law of the Republic of Uganda applies
and under it the complaint must be dismissed, that the decision under review is
contrary to the act of state doctrine, and that said decision violates the Bretton
Woods Agreement.
Subdivision 2 of section 200-b of the Banking Law, entitled "Actions
maintained against foreign banking corporation; residents; foreign corporations,
foreign banking corporations as nonresidents," provides in part:
2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, an action ... against a foreign
banking corporation may be maintained by another foreign corporation or foreign
banking corporation or by a nonresident in the following cases only: ...
(c) where the cause of action arose within this state ...
Subdivison (b) of section 1314 of the Business Corporation Law contains almost
identical language.
A letter of credit, a well-known instrumentality of commerce (Kingdom of
Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441), is governed by the same
general principles of law as are all other contracts in writing (Moss v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 151; Bank of United States v. Seltzer, 233 App. Div.
225, 229). It is either revocable or irrevocable and, once the latter has been
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established, the consent of all parties, particularly the beneficiary, is necessary in
order to modify the original terms and conditions of the credit (Lamborn v.
National Park Bank of New York, 240 NY 520, 525; Dulien Steel Products of
Wash. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 927, aff'd. 298 F.2d 836 [C.C.A.
2, 1962]).
The first cause of the complaint alleges and the facts establish a cause of action
occurring within New York. In the irrevocable letter of credit 110/84 under
scrutiny, defendant contracted to pay upon compliance with its terms (Lamborn
v. National Park Bank of New York, supra, at p. 525) and defendant's order
countermanding payment by cable and letter took effect upon receipt by Citibank
in New York and then gave rise to a cause of action here (Gonzalez v. Industrial
Bank [of Cuba], 12 N.Y. 2d 33, 38). Citing Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe (84
N.Y. 367), this court stated in Gonzalez that "a cause of action arises where that
is done which should not be done." In this instance, New York was the locus of
repudiation, whereas it should have been a site of payment. The provision
respecting reimbursement in New York was an integral part of that for which the
parties bargained, it was not a discrete obligation. The separate character of
defendant's undertakings is negated by its guarantee of payment of drafts. The
value to those in commerce of having a place at a financial capital where funds
can be obtained on a simple letter of credit, away from a relatively small bank in
an undeveloped country of uncertain political stability, is obvious. The
reimbursement provision is quite essential, economically, to the total
arrangement since a promisee would be unwilling to present a draft based on a
letter of credit, in dollar terms, to a commercial house in the United States and
then be required to wait a relatively inordinate time for the money to come from a
remote source.
When defendant, the issuer, repudiated the letter of credit before presentment
of the draft and before expiration of the letter, it was guilty of an anticipatory
breach of contract and became liable for damages caused the beneficiary (Foglino
& Co. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 297-98, mod. on other grounds 244 N.Y.
516; Doelger v. Battery Park National Bank, 201 App. Div. 515, 521-522;
Mendelson v. Wechsler, 203 N.Y.S. 197; 34 NY Jur, Letters of Credit, § 38; see
Uniform Commercial Code, § 5-115).
We come now to the question of the choice of law. "'[The rule which has
evolved clearly in our most recent decisions is that the law of the jurisdiction
having the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied and that the facts or
contacts which obtain significance in defining State interests are those which
relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict"' (Intercontinental Planning
v. Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382). New York has an overriding and paramount
interest in the outcome of this litigation. It is a financial capital of the world,
serving as an international clearinghouse and market place for a plethora of
international transactions, such as to be so recognized by our decisional law
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(IntercontinentalPlanning v. Daystrom, supra, at pp. 383-84). A vast amount of
international letter of credit business is customarily handled by certain New York
banks whose facilities and foreign connections are particularly adaptable to this
field of operation (34 N.Y. Jur., Letters of Credit, § 10, p. 427). The parties, by
listing United States dollars as the form of payment, impliedly accepted these
facts and set up procedures to implement their trust in our policies. In order to
maintain its preeminent financial position, it is important that the justified ex-
pectations of the parties to the contract be protected (cf, Kossick v. United Fruit
Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741). Since New York has the greatest interest and is most
intimately concerned with the outcome of this litigation, its laws should be
accorded paramount control over the legal issues presented (cf Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 161).
As typified by strong anti-Israel and anti-semitic suggestions made by
Uganda's President to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Bank of
Uganda, by message dated March 28, 1972 and marked "TOP SECRET,"
directed defendant that "all payments to Israel companies and their agents, and
to the Government of Israel whether by cheques .... or by letters of credit,
should not be processed until clearance has been obtained from the under-
signed." Sixteen days later in a message marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and to
vhich was attached references to letters of credit 110/84 and 110/85, defendant
was informed that "[t]here can never be any basis for the expenditure of foreign
exchange unless value in the form of goods has been received in Uganda" and that
"no foreign exchange payment should be effected on any of the allocations
already advised to you on behalf of any Israel company." Defendant contends
that these revocations or cancellations of foreign exchange allocations in favor of
the beneficiary of credit number 110/84 were authorized by the Exchange
Control Act of Uganda.
Laws of foreign governments have extraterritorial jurisdiction only by comity
(Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669; Mertz v. Mertz, 217 N.Y. 466, 470).
The principle which determines whether we shall give effect to foreign legislation
is that of public policy and, where there is a conflict between our public policy and
application of comity, our own sense of justice and equity as embodied in our
public policy must prevail (Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263
N.Y. 369, 378). It is clear, that no attempted confiscatory or discriminatory act of
the Ugandan government, enforced or enacted after the issuance of letter of
credit 110/84 could diminish the beneficiary's rights in respect to reimbursement
and defendant's funds located in New York (see N.Y. Const., art. 1, §§ 6, 11).
There being no present policy of the executive branch of the United States gov-
ernment requiring acquiescence in the confiscatory and discriminatory acts of the
Ugandan government, the well-known policy of this state against such
acquiescence is operative (Gonzalez v. IndustrialBank [of Cuba], 12 N.Y. 2d 33,
supra, at p. 39). Although the letter of credit when made was valid under the laws
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of Uganda, by virtue of subsequent governmental action the contract became
unenforceable in that country. This action, however, was of no force in New York
and the doctrine of impossibility of performance lends no comfort to defendant.
Neither does the federal act of state doctrine apply. The essence of this legal
principle is that the courts of this country cannot question an act of a recognized
foreign nation committed within its own territory, no matter how grossly that
sovereign has transgressed its own law (seeBancoNacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 416; French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y. 2d 46, 52). The
doctrine is not applicable here since a debt is not "located" within a foreign state
unless that state has the power to enforce or collect it (Menendez v. Saks & Co.,
485 F.2d 1355, 1364, cert. den. ____U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 2382).
Defendant urges that enforcement of the letter of credit contract would violate
the foreign exchange laws of Uganda in disregard of a treaty. Uganda and the
United States are signatories to the Bretton Woods Agreement (60 Stat. 1401 et
seq.) which, in relevant part under section 2 (b) of article VIII, provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to
the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently
with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.
Contrary to defendants' position, the Agreement, even when read in its broadest
sense, fails to bring the letter of credit within its scope, since said letter of credit is
not an exchange contract. In Banco Do Brasil, S. A. v. Israel Commodity Co. (12
N.Y. 2d 371), this court frowned on an interpretation of said provision of the
Bretton Woods Agreement which "sweeps in all contracts affecting any members'
exchange resources as doing considerable violence to the text of the section" (pp.
375-76).
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed with costs.
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